Abstract-Recently, a practical public integrity auditing scheme supporting multiuser data modification (IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON INFOR-MATION FORENSICS AND SECURITY, DOI 10.1109/TIFS.2015.2423264) was proposed. Although the protocol was claimed secure, in this paper, we show that the proposal fails to achieve soundness, the most essential property that an auditing scheme should provide. Specifically, we show that a cloud server can collude with a revoked user to deceive a third-party auditor (TPA) that a stored file keeps virgin even when the entire file has been deleted.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the above paper [2] , Yuan and Yu proposed a novel and efficient integrity auditing scheme supporting multiuser modification, public auditing, high error detection probability and efficient user revocation. Cloud storage enables cloud users to focus more on their core competencies by alleviating data owners' burden of local data storage and maintenance. However, data integrity becomes the biggest concern of cloud users because they lose physical control over their outsourced files. Ateniese et al. proposed the notion of provable data possession [1] , or data auditing, to address this challenging problem, which was extended in [2] .
Contributions. We show the schemes in [2] fail to achieve the basic property of a secure auditing scheme -soundness. We demonstrate that in the scheme with basic user revocation, if a malicious cloud server colludes with a revoked user, the server is able to generate a valid proof of a challenge even if the entire file has been deleted. The same attack can also be applied to the multi-file auditing protocol and the protocol with advanced user revocation in [2] .
II. REVIEW
Some notations of the system are as follows. H () denotes a one-way hash function and λ represents a security parameter. G, G 1 denote two multiplicative cyclic groups and e : G × G → G 1 is a bilinear map. q is the order of G and g, u are random generators of G. f α (x) denotes a polynomial with
The data owner, u 0 , is the master user who can revoke any other group users when necessary. We briefly review the following algorithms in [2] to support our analysis.
File Processing. u 0 first splits the file F into n blocks, and each block into s sectors: {m i j } 1≤i≤n,0≤ j ≤s−1 , and computes authentication tag {σ i } 1≤i≤n for each block as: Prove. Upon receiving the challenge C M = (D, X, g R , μ), the cloud server generates a proof Pr f = (π, ψ, y) and forwards it to the TPA for verification. We omit the details of generating a proof due to space limit.
Verify. Upon receiving the proof, the TPA verifies the integrity of F by first computing η = u ω , where w = i∈D B i p i . Then it checks if the following equation holds:
1556-6013 © 2015 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. and sends it to the cloud. u 0 also computes g 0 0 +ρ and forwards it to the valid group users and the TPA as a part of the PK. 2) Upon receiving χ, the cloud updates the authentication tags of blocks that are lastly modified by u k as:
3) The TPA and the valid group users discard the public information g 0 k .
III. REMARKS ON THE PROTOCOL
Firstly, we revisit the system model of public integrity auditing for dynamic data sharing with multiuser modification [2] . As illustrated in Fig. 1 , the system is composed of three major entities, namely the cloud server, the TPA and group users. Some users are valid users who can access and modify the cloud data while some other users have been revoked due to a variety of reasons. For example, the secret key of the user has been exposed or the user becomes dishonest. Consequently, it is fair to assume that valid users in the group are honest but the revoked users have incentive to become an adversary of the system, i.e., they might collude with a malicious cloud server to deceive a verifier.
A. Soundness of the Protocol With Basic User Revocation
In the following, we describe a feasable attack on the protocols in [2] where a malicious cloud server can collude with a revoked user to generate a valid response even if the entire file stored on cloud has been deleted.
During the execution of the protocol, the Key Generation, File Processing and Update algorithm are the same as those in [2] . Given a challenge C M = {D, X, E = g R , μ}, assume the set D contains blocks lastly modified by a revoked user, say u k (1 ≤ k ≤ K − 1) with secret key k . According to the protocol, (g With such information and the system public parameters, the cloud server and the revoked user can collude to generate a response for challenge C M without using the challenged data file as follows.
k}).
• Compute w = i∈D B i p i and η = u ω .
• Retrieving (g 0 0 +ρ ) R from X, with the value k from the revoked user and χ from the cloud server, they compute
• Pick a random t * ∈ Z q , compute ψ * = g t * and B = E t * .
• Pick a random y * ∈ Z q .
• Compute
The forgery Pr f * = {π * , ψ * , y * } is a valid proof for the challenge C M because it can pass the Verify algorithm.
Therefore, the forged proof Pr f * is valid. The cloud server can deceive T P A that the file keeps intact even the entire file has been polluted or deleted. Note that the same attack can be applied to the protocol for efficient multi-file auditing, where the TPA can handle integrity auditing of multiple files simultaneously at the cost comparable to the single file scenario, and we don't repeat the attack here.
B. Soundness of the Protocol With Advanced User Revocation
An advanced user revocation protocol was also proposed in [2] to prevent the revoked users from generating valid authentication tags by compromising a single cloud server node. In this enhanced scheme, the master user u 0 runs a (U, N)-Shamir secret sharing protocol to generate N points
Those N points will be sent to N nodes of a cloud server. Unfortunately, this technique cannot make the protocol sound because it is the cloud server who acts as the adversary when considering soundness and any U out of N cloud nodes are able to recover χ using Lagrange interpolation over a finite field. Specifically, given any U pairs (i, f (i)), χ can be recovered as
With the recovered χ, the malicious cloud server can collude with a revoked user to break the soundness of the improved protocol in [2] .
Real-world dangers. If the protocols in [2] are adopted in reality, after corrupting a revoked user, the malicious cloud service providers can deceive the data owners by making use of the aforementioned attacks. Consequently, the cloud servers can charge the data owners for storage without hesitation but do not store their data. As a result, the date owners cannot retrieve the outsourced data when needed, which might incur a significant loss to data owners since the lost data might be important and unique.
